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OPINION OF THE COURT
            
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs in this appeal are fourteen individuals who
retired from Unisys Corporation (Unisys) between 1987 and
1989.  These individuals were originally employed by
Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs) which merged with Sperry
Corporation (Sperry) in September 1986 to form Unisys.  In
1992, after the plaintiffs had retired, Unisys announced the
elimination of its preexisting retiree medical benefits plans and
the implementation of a new medical benefits plan effective
January 1, 1993.  Although this case carries with it a
complicated procedural history due to the evolution of the
For a more detailed review of the evolution of this1
litigation, see In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit ERISA
Litigation, 58 F.3d 896, 899-901 (3d Cir. 1995) (Unisys I); In re
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original class actions, which were filed as early as 1992 on
behalf of thousands of Burroughs, Sperry, and Unisys retirees,
this immediate appeal stems from a July 16, 2007 decision,
following a bench trial, in which the District Court determined
that Unisys breached its fiduciary duty to twelve of the fourteen
plaintiffs.  As a remedy, the District Court ordered that the
terminated retiree plan be reinstated for these twelve plaintiffs
and enjoined Unisys from making any changes to coverage
under that plan.  Additionally, in a June 26, 2008 decision, the
District Court awarded plaintiffs approximately $2.3 million in
attorneys’ fees.  Unisys challenges the District Court’s finding
of liability, the relief it ordered, and its award of attorneys’ fees.
In a cross-appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court
erred in denying retrospective monetary relief to fully remedy
the violations they suffered and also that the District Court erred
in concluding two of the fourteen plaintiffs did not establish
detrimental reliance and therefore could not prevail on their
claims.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the District
Court in all respects.
I.
Although the factual and procedural history of this
extensive litigation have been discussed in a number of previous
opinions, we will recount this background information to the
extent it is relevant to the instant appeal.   In September 1986,1
Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit ERISA Litigation, 57 F.3d
1255, 1257-61 (3d Cir. 1995) (Unisys II); and In re Unisys
Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit ERISA Litigation, 242 F.3d 497,
499-502 (3d Cir. 2001) (Unisys III).
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Sperry and Burroughs, two competing computer manufacturers,
merged to form Unisys.  Prior to the merger, both Sperry and
Burroughs provided post-retirement medical coverage to their
retired employees at little or no cost to the retirees.  After the
merger, Unisys continued to provide the pre-merger benefits
under a variety of Sperry plans and the Burroughs Medical Plan.
Unisys also created its own medical benefits plan, which had
different terms and costs than the Burroughs and Sperry plans,
for employees who retired after April 1, 1989.  In the process of
implementing this new plan, Unisys informed employees who
were eligible to retire that they could participate in the existing
Burroughs or Sperry plans if they retired prior to April 1, 1989,
but after that time they would only be eligible to participate in
the new Unisys plan.  The fourteen individual plaintiffs in the
present appeal were originally Burroughs employees and retired
from Unisys between December 1986 and April 1, 1989.
On October 30, 1992, Unisys announced that it was
terminating the then-existing Burroughs, Sperry, and Unisys
plans, and replacing them with a new consolidated plan effective
January 1, 1993.  Under the new plan, retirees were responsible
for increasing levels of premium contribution until January 1,
1996, at which point they were required to pay the full cost of
coverage.  In reaction to the change, multiple lawsuits were filed
in various jurisdictions alleging violations of the Employee
Although this litigation was originally before Judge2
Edward N. Cahn, on January 5, 1999, Judge Bruce W.
Kauffman was appointed to preside over all of the related
matters following Judge Cahn’s retirement.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461, and the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
eventually assigned those cases to Judge Cahn in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.2
On June 9, 1993, the District Court approved the parties’
stipulation to certify three separate classes consisting of
approximately 21,000 Sperry, Burroughs, and Unisys retirees.
Each of these classes was further divided into “regular” retirees
and “early” retirees.  The class members in each of the six
subclasses asserted three separate claims: breach of contract,
equitable estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty.
On October 13, 1993, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Unisys on the estoppel and breach of
fiduciary duty claims of the Sperry, Burroughs, and Unisys
regular retirees, as well as the breach of contract claims of the
Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees.  In re Unisys Corp.
Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 837 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Pa.
1993).  The District Court granted Unisys summary judgment on
the breach of contract claims of the Burroughs and Unisys
regular retirees because the “summary plan descriptions contain
uncontradicted and unambiguous reservation of rights
language.”  Id. at 681.  The District Court granted summary
judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims of all of the
8retirees because the “alleged oral misrepresentations about the
terms of the plans by agents of Unisys and its successors, in
their capacity as plan administrators, do not constitute breaches
of their fiduciary duty.”  Id.  And lastly, the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Unisys on all of the
estoppel claims because the plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate that
they relied to their detriment on oral and written representations
of the plan administrators.”  Id.  As a result of this decision, only
the breach of contract claims of the Sperry regular retirees and
all claims of all early retirees remained viable.
Thereafter, the District Court conducted a seven-day
bench trial on the remaining claims.  Following trial, but before
closing arguments, the Sperry and Burroughs early retirees
reached a settlement with Unisys; however, the claims of the
Unisys early retirees and the breach of contract claims of the
Sperry regular retirees remained viable.  On June 23, 1994, the
District Court entered judgment in favor of Unisys on all of
these remaining claims.  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med.
Benefits ERISA Litig., No. MDL 969, 1994 WL 284079 (E.D.
Pa. June 23, 1994).  However, the District Court also granted the
Sperry retirees’ motion for reconsideration of their breach of
fiduciary duty claim in light of the decision in Bixler v. Central
Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1294 (3d Cir. 1993), rendered during the pendency of the
litigation, in which this Court held that a direct action for breach
of fiduciary duty exists in the “other appropriate equitable
relief” clause of ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3)(B).  The District Court explained that “based on
the evidence and the law in this circuit, it seems possible that at
least some plaintiffs will be able to sustain a [breach of fiduciary
9duty] claim.”  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA
Litig., 1994 WL 284079, at *27.  The District Court certified
this portion of its decision for immediate interlocutory appeal.
The plaintiffs also appealed all of the District Court’s summary
judgment rulings with the exception of the breach of fiduciary
duty claims of the Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees (which
were being held in abeyance by the District Court).
On June 28, 1995, in separate opinions, our Court
affirmed the District Court in all respects.  In re Unisys Corp.
Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Unisys I) (affirming grant of summary judgment on breach of
contract and equitable estoppel claims); In re Unisys Corp.
Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir.
1995) (Unisys II) (affirming reinstatement of breach of fiduciary
duty claims).  Accordingly, the Sperry regular retiree breach of
fiduciary duty claims were remanded for adjudication.  On
August 13, 1996, the District Court also reinstated the breach of
fiduciary duty claims of the Burroughs and Unisys regular
retirees.  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig.,
No. MDL 969, 1996 WL 455968 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 1996).
These breach of fiduciary duty claims of the Sperry, Burroughs,
and Unisys regular retirees were the only claims that remained
from the original class action litigation.
On March 10, 1997, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Unisys on the breach of fiduciary duty
claims of over 14,000 retirees after it concluded that “the statute
of limitations bars the claims of many of the retirees, and that
many of the retirees cannot demonstrate the resulting harm
required to maintain a breach of fiduciary duty claim.”  In re
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Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 957 F. Supp.
628, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  But four years later, on March 9,
2001, our Court reversed this summary judgment ruling and
reinstated the breach of fiduciary duty claims of these
individuals for two reasons.  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med.
Benefit “ERISA” Litig., 242 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2001) (Unisys
III).  First, we interpreted ERISA’s statute of limitations for
breach of fiduciary duty claims and concluded that the
“summary judgment entered by the District Court was overbroad
and must be reversed.”  Id. at 507.  Second, we rejected the
“District Court’s view that Unisys II, as a matter of law, limits
recovery on the breach of fiduciary duty claims to claims based
on voluntary decisions to retire.”  Id. at 508.
After this decision, the parties agreed to settle all of the
remaining Sperry regular retiree breach of fiduciary duty claims.
As a result, the only remaining claims were those of the
approximately 10,000 Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees for
breach of fiduciary duty.  On February 4, 2003, the District
Court granted Unisys’ motion to decertify the Burroughs and
Unisys regular retiree subclasses because of the need to make
individual factual determinations in the adjudication of the
claims, and thereafter five separate multi-plaintiff breach of
fiduciary duty actions were filed against Unisys by
approximately 900 of these former class members.  In re Unisys
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Litig., No. MDL 969, 2003 WL
252106 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2003).
The claims of the Burroughs regular retirees who
continued in the litigation were filed together under the caption
of Adair, et al. v. Unisys Corp.  On July 15, 2005, after more
Although the decision was filed on July 16, 2007, the3
corresponding order, from which both parties appeal, was not
entered on the docket until July 18, 2007.
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than ten years of developments in the litigation, the parties
agreed to sever from the Adair complaint the breach of fiduciary
duty claims of fourteen individuals, namely the plaintiffs who
are currently before this Court, so they could proceed to trial
before Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter.  They also stipulated
that the District Court would review all findings of fact for clear
error.
From October 17 to October 26, 2005, Magistrate Judge
Rueter presided over a bench trial on these claims and, on
September 29, 2006, he issued a Report and Recommendation,
concluding that twelve of the fourteen plaintiffs had proven that
Unisys breached its fiduciary duty to them as a result of the
company’s affirmative misrepresentations and inadequate
disclosure of certain information about the retirees’ medical
benefits plan.  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Erisa
Litig., No. MDL 969, 2006 WL 2822261, at *58 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 29, 2006) (Magistrate Report).  The Magistrate Judge
recommended that the District Court enter an equitable decree
restoring the Burroughs Medical Plan for the twelve retirees and
reforming the plan to preclude any right to terminate or modify
their benefits.  Id. at *65.
On July 16, 2007, the District Court issued a decision
adopting in part and modifying in part the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation.   In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med.3
In September 2008, Unisys reached an agreement with4
the remaining Burroughs plaintiffs to settle their breach of
fiduciary duty claims.
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Benefits Erisa Litig., No. MDL 969, 2007 WL 2071876 (E.D.
Pa. July 16, 2007) (District Court Opinion).  The District Court
adopted all of the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and the
legal conclusion that Unisys breached its fiduciary duty to
twelve of the plaintiffs.  Id. at *3, *9.  The District Court
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to restore the
Burroughs Medical Plan, but instead of ordering the reformation
of the plan, it enjoined Unisys from amending or terminating the
plan as to the twelve retirees, thus requiring Unisys to continue
to pay the premiums for their medical coverage.  Id. at *10.  The
District Court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for monetary
damages under a claim for restitution.  Id. at *11.  Lastly, on
June 26, 2008, the District Court awarded plaintiffs
$2,266,357.92 in attorneys’ fees and $97,779.98 for litigation
expenses.  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Erisa Litig.,
No. MDL 969, 2008 WL 2600364 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2008) (Fee
Opinion).  Unisys timely appealed the District Court’s orders
and the plaintiffs cross-appealed.4
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), and we have jurisdiction to
review its orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “In an appeal
from an ERISA bench trial, we review findings of fact for clear
error but have plenary review over the District Court’s
13
conclusions of law.”  Vitale v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 420 F.3d
278, 281 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Determining what remedies are
available under a statute is a question of statutory interpretation
that requires de novo review.  Therefore, we review de novo the
District Court’s grant of an injunction and its denial of
restitution” and other forms of relief.  Pell v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 539 F.3d 292, 305 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).  “An award of . . . attorneys’ fees to a prevailing
plaintiff in an ERISA case is within the discretion of the district
court and may only be reversed for abuse of discretion.”
Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 305
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To that end,
“[w]e review the District Court’s factual determinations . . . for
clear error,” and “[w]e exercise plenary review over the legal
standards employed by the District Court used in calculating the
award.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
A.  Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Unisys challenges the District Court’s conclusion that
Unisys breached its fiduciary duty to twelve of the fourteen
plaintiffs.  ERISA § 404 provides:
“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and –
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
14
(i) providing benefits to
participants and their
beneficiaries; and
(ii) d e f r a y in g  r e a so n a b l e
expenses of administering
the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like
aims;”
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  We have explained that “[a]lthough the
statute articulates a number of fiduciary duties, it is not
exhaustive.  Rather, Congress relied upon the common law of
trusts to ‘define the general scope of [trustees’ and other
fiduciaries’] authority and responsibility.’”  Bixler, 12 F.3d at
1299 (quoting Cent. States Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc.,
472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)); see In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74
F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that ERISA § 404 “in
essence, codifies and makes applicable to . . . fiduciaries certain
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, an ERISA
“fiduciary may not, in the performance of [its] duties,
‘materially mislead those to whom the duties of loyalty and
prudence are owed.’”  Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d
15
475, 492 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1261).
This responsibility encompasses “not only a negative duty not to
misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the
trustee knows that silence might be harmful.”  Bixler, 12 F.3d at
1300; see Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1264 (explaining the duty “not to
misinform employees” through either “misrepresentations” or
“incomplete, inconsistent or contradictory disclosures”).  In
short, “when a fiduciary speaks, it must speak truthfully, and
when it communicates with plan participants and beneficiaries
it must convey complete and accurate information that is
material to their circumstance.”  In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74
F.3d at 442 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets
omitted).
Thus, as is the case in the present appeal, a breach of
fiduciary duty claim may be premised on either a
misrepresentation or an omission.  To establish such a breach,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that:  (1) the defendant was “acting
in a fiduciary capacity”; (2) the defendant made “affirmative
misrepresentations or failed to adequately inform plan
participants and beneficiaries”; (3) the misrepresentation or
inadequate disclosure was material; and (4) the plaintiff
detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation or inadequate
disclosure.  Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., U.A.W. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188
F.3d 130, 148 (3d Cir. 1999); accord Burstein v. Ret. Account
Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health, Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 384 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the test for
misrepresentations); Daniels v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 263 F.3d
66, 73 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).
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As for the first element, “ERISA . . . defines ‘fiduciary’
not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of
control and authority over the plan.”  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993).  Accordingly, “[f]iduciary duties
under ERISA attach not just to particular persons, but to
particular persons performing particular functions.”  Hozier v.
Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, “a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan only
to the extent that he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.”
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 527 (1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  “A plan administrator . . . acts as a
fiduciary when explaining plan benefits and business decisions
about plan benefits to its employees.”  Adams, 204 F.3d at 492.
However, “[t]he amendment of an ERISA plan is not a fiduciary
act governed by ERISA.”  Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 454 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2006).
The second element, a misrepresentation or inadequate
disclosure, is best understood when viewed in conjunction with
the third element, which requires that the misrepresentation or
omission be material.  “A misleading statement or omission by
a fiduciary” is material if “‘there is a substantial likelihood that
it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an
adequately informed retirement decision,’” Harte v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Unisys
II, 57 F.3d at 1264), or “a harmful decision regarding benefits,”
Daniels, 263 F.3d at 76.  Determining whether a
misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure bears a substantial
likelihood of misleading a reasonable employee may involve
examining whether the “fiduciary, as an objective matter, knew
17
or should have known that a beneficiary would be confused” by
the statement or omission.  Burstein, 334 F.3d at 386 n.31; see
also Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity
Fund v. Newbridge Sec., Inc., 93 F.3d 1171, 1182 (3d Cir. 1996)
(describing omitted information as material if it is “known to the
fiduciary but unknown to the beneficiary” and necessary for the
beneficiary to “know for its own protection”).  Thus, while
showing that the fiduciary “had actual knowledge that a
particular employee was about to be misled” is not required to
satisfy this element, establishing a fiduciary’s liability as a result
of inadequately disclosed information may involve an inquiry
into “the employer’s knowledge of an employee’s knowledge
and understanding,” Daniels, 263 F.3d at 76, in order to
determine if the employer was aware of the confusion generated
by its silence.
Finally, although we have at times described the fourth
element as “resulting harm” to the plaintiff, Unisys II, 57 F.3d
at 1265, we have since clarified that this element requires a
showing of detrimental reliance by the plaintiff.  See Hooven v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 571 (3d Cir. 2006).  Notably,
detrimental reliance is not limited to the retirement decision
alone; rather it may encompass decisions to decline other
employment opportunities, to forego the opportunity to purchase
supplemental health insurance, or other important financial
decisions pertaining to retirement.  Unisys III, 242 F.3d at 508
(rejecting the view that recovery for breach of fiduciary duty
claims was limited to “claims based on voluntary decisions to
retire”); cf. Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1301-03; Curcio v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 237 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Turning to the instant case, the essence of the plaintiffs’
breach of fiduciary duty claims, as summarized by the District
Court, is “that Unisys (1) misrepresented that their retiree
medical benefits were vested and could not change despite
clauses in certain plan documents reserving the right to modify
or terminate those benefits, and (2) failed adequately to advise
them of that reserved right.”  District Court Opinion, 2007 WL
2071876, at *1.  The District Court concluded:
“The alleged misrepresentations made by Unisys
may not have been technically false, but the
factual findings of the Magistrate Judge establish
that they were nonetheless misleading.  They were
misleading because [Unisys] failed to qualify
adequately the information it supplied regarding
the low cost of the Burroughs plan with an
acknowledgment that [Unisys] could modify or
terminate the retirees’ medical benefits.  [Unisys]
knew its employees were confused and that this
confusion would benefit the company
financially.”
Id. at *5.
On appeal, Unisys contends that the District Court erred
when it concluded that Unisys misrepresented and failed to
disclose material information in violation of its fiduciary duty
under ERISA, although Unisys also made clear in both its briefs
and at oral argument before this Court that it does not challenge
the District Court’s factual findings and “does not dispute what
Plaintiffs claim they were told or not told about retiree medical
19
benefits.”  In support of its position, Unisys emphasizes that it
satisfied its statutory disclosure obligations by disclosing, in
written communications, its right to amend or terminate the
Burroughs Medical Plan, and that this Court has previously held
that its reservation of rights clauses contained in its summary
plan descriptions were unambiguous.  Relying on these two
points, Unisys argues that its oral communications regarding
plan benefits did not “constitute an ‘affirmative
misrepresentation’ or ‘failure to disclose’ simply because each
statement was not coupled with an additional warning that the
benefits were subject to change.”  Citing our decisions in
Leuthner, 454 F.3d at 129, and Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric
Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996), Unisys also stresses that
at the time its oral statements were made, it was not planning to
change retiree benefits, so it cannot be found to have breached
its fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.  Unisys raises this last
argument in the context of the second element, asserting that its
oral statements were an accurate reflection of its intent when the
statements were made (and therefore did not constitute
misrepresentations), and in the context of the third element,
asserting that it was not “seriously considering” any changes to
the medical benefits plans at the time its statements were made
(and therefore the allegedly undisclosed information was not
material).
The plaintiffs, in response, contend that “[t]he district
court correctly ruled on the basis of the extensive record that this
case does not involve truthful, accurate statements of intention
by Unisys, but instead involves statements that were misleading,
company knowledge that employees were confused, and
exploitation of this confusion to ‘benefit the company
20
financially.’”  The plaintiffs also maintain that the District Court
“correctly concluded that this Court’s decisions foreclosed an
argument by Unisys that its [summary plan descriptions] and
other documents were sufficient to avoid liability.”
Based on the applicable legal standards and the factual
findings of the Magistrate Judge, which were adopted in their
entirety by the District Court, Unisys’ arguments must be
rejected.  With respect to the first element, fiduciary status, the
Magistrate Judge found the following:
“[E]ach of the Trial Plaintiffs have established
that [Unisys’] agents communicated with the Trial
Plaintiffs about retiree medical benefits and that
such [Unisys] employees had apparent, if not
actual, authority to make such communications.
In addition to the documentation that [Unisys]
distributed regarding retiree benefits, each Trial
Plaintiff credibly testified that he or she was
advised by either a member of the human
resources staff or a supervisor about the cost and
duration of retiree medical benefits.  It is apparent
from the trial testimony that [Unisys] delegated to
the human resources staff and other managers the
function of advising employees about benefits.”
Magistrate Report, 2006 WL 2822261, at *45.  Although Unisys
does not appear to contest this element on appeal, we conclude
in any event that the Magistrate Judge’s determination is legally
sound, as we have stated that an employer “acts as a fiduciary
21
when explaining plan benefits and business decisions about plan
benefits to its employees,” Adams, 204 F.3d at 492.
With respect to the second element, the Magistrate Judge
concluded that the facts supported finding that Unisys both
misrepresented and inadequately disclosed information
regarding retirement benefits.  As to the former, the Magistrate
Judge stated that it
“finds credible the testimony of each of the Trial
Plaintiffs that [Unisys] misrepresented the cost
and duration of retiree medical benefits under the
Burroughs Plan by advising each of them that he
or she would have free or low-cost medical
benefits throughout retirement or for life.
* * * 
In determining whether to retire, [Unisys]
counseled each Trial Plaintiff, either individually
or as part of a group meeting, about the cost and
duration of retiree medical benefits, representing
that the benefits would cost a retiree $20 per
month until age sixty-five, after which time there
would be no cost to the retiree.”
Magistrate Report, 2006 WL 2822261, at *47-48.  The
Magistrate Judge was correct to conclude that these
communications amounted to misrepresentations.  Although the
statement that “benefits would cost a retiree $20 per month until
age sixty-five, after which time there would be no cost to the
22
retiree” was not in and of itself false, it was nevertheless a
misrepresentation because it created the impression that the
retirees would enjoy these benefits for the remainder of their
lifetimes without the possibility of change.  As the Magistrate
Judge observed, the message that Unisys communicated to its
employees in the course of counseling them about retirement
was at best a half-truth because there was no mention of Unisys’
right to amend or terminate the plan at any point in the future.
In essence, by failing to qualify its statements, Unisys placed a
period where it should have placed a comma in the course of
explaining retiree medical benefits to these plaintiffs and, in
doing so, misrepresented the cost and duration of the benefits.
Even though, as Unisys points out, the words
“guaranteed” or “vested” were not used in describing the
plaintiffs’ retiree benefits under the Burroughs Medical Plan,
informing the plaintiffs that they would enjoy “free or low-cost
medical benefits throughout retirement or for life” created the
same impression and therefore was a misrepresentation.
Additionally, we are not persuaded by Unisys’ argument that its
statements cannot form the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty
claim because, at the time of its oral communications with the
plaintiffs, Unisys did not intend to change the plan; this
contention is irrelevant because Unisys had the ability to change
the plan and its statements did not make this clear.  See Unisys
II, 57 F.3d at 1265 n.15 (“[W]hile Unisys may not have
anticipated ending the plans, it knew that it had the ability to do
so and it knew that its employees were receiving answers to
their specific inquiries that were vague, misleading and
contradictory.”).  Thus, given the content of Unisys’ statements
and the context in which these statements were made, the
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communications constituted misrepresentations and the
Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding as much.
In addition to finding that Unisys misrepresented
information, the Magistrate Judge also found that Unisys failed
to adequately disclose benefits information because
“[a] representation to the effect that the benefits
would cost $20 per month for the retiree and then
be provided at no cost for the rest of retirement or
the retiree’s life does not convey complete
information if [Unisys] retains the right to change
or terminate those benefits at any time.”
Magistrate Report, 2006 WL 2822261, at *53.  Relevant to
Unisys’ argument that it disclosed its reservation of rights in a
summary plan description, the Magistrate Judge found that
Unisys had a “policy that the retiree [summary plan description]
was made available to those who requested it, but it was only
distributed to retirees after they had submitted an enrollment
card to receive retiree medical benefits under the Burroughs
Plan.”  Id. at *51.  The Magistrate Judge went on to explain that
“there is a significant temporal aspect to the present factual
scenario.  [Unisys’] lack of complete disclosure regarding its
reserved right to change or terminate retiree medical benefits
occurred when [Unisys] was specifically counseling the Trial
Plaintiffs about retiree benefits, at a time when the Trial
Plaintiffs were making retirement decisions.”  Id. at *53.
Therefore, Unisys’ failure to disclose at this particular time its
ability to modify or wholly eliminate the plaintiffs’ medical
benefits at any point in the future, despite its unambiguous
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reservation of rights clause contained in the summary plan
description, resulted in an inadequate disclosure of information.
Consequently, Unisys’ arguments that it disclosed its reservation
of rights in the summary plan descriptions and other
documentation is unavailing because Unisys did not present this
information when it was counseling its employees on their
retirement decisions.  See Adams, 204 F.3d at 492 (“[A]
company cannot insulate itself from liability by including
unequivocal statements retaining the right to terminate plans at
any time in the [summary plan descriptions].”).
Turning to the third requirement, materiality, we
conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis correctly applied
our caselaw on this element by focusing on whether “there [was]
a substantial likelihood” that the misrepresentations and
omissions “would mislead a reasonable employee in making an
adequately informed retirement decision,” Unisys II, 57 F.3d at
1264, or “a decision regarding his benefits under the ERISA
plan,” Daniels, 263 F.3d at 73.  We agree with the Magistrate
Judge’s conclusion that Unisys’ “misrepresentations were
material in that there was a substantial likelihood that each
misrepresentation would mislead a reasonable employee in
making a decision regarding his or her retiree medical benefits
under the Burroughs Plan,” and, in the context of Unisys’
inadequate disclosures, that Unisys “knew of the confusion
generated by its silence.”  Magistrate Report, 2006 WL
2822261, at *47, *51.  As the Magistrate Judge determined, “a
reasonable fiduciary would have foreseen that its conduct
towards each Trial Plaintiff would result in important decision
making on his or her part based on a mistaken belief that each
possessed guaranteed lifetime benefits.”  Id. at *48, *51.
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The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion was well-supported
by the record.  In particular, the Magistrate Judge found that
“the cost and duration of retiree medical benefits is a significant
factor to an employee who is contemplating whether retirement
is feasible at the time,” and that Unisys “knew that the
retirement decision was significant, that the cost of retiree
medical benefits was significant, and that participation in a
specific medical plan was considered a powerful motivation in
the retirement decision.”  Id. at *48, *53.  Additionally, the
Magistrate Judge observed that “[t]he trial record makes clear
that the employee population did not understand that changes to
the Burroughs Plan for active employees also translated to
changes to retiree medical benefits”; Unisys “frequently referred
to retiree medical benefits as though they were provided under
a separate plan”; and “despite the actions it took to explain the
benefits it provided, [Unisys] was aware that its employees were
confused about benefits.”  Id. at *48, *51, *52.  Moreover, the
Magistrate Judge recognized that it could not “simply ignore the
existence of the [summary plan description],” but nonetheless
determined that “[e]ven taking into consideration the reservation
of rights provisions” in these documents, it was foreseeable that
employees in the position of the plaintiffs would rely to their
detriment upon Unisys’ misleading statements about the cost
and duration of retiree medical benefits at the time they were
seeking counsel about their retirement decisions.  Id. at *47-48.
Unisys’ argument that its reservation of the right to
amend the Burroughs Medical Plan was not material because it
was not considering any changes to the plan at the time it was
communicating with the plaintiffs is of no consequence because
the ability to change the plan was critical information that
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Unisys knew and the beneficiaries needed to know in order to
protect themselves from potential harm.  Additionally, because
it was foreseeable that these plaintiffs would rely on Unisys’
misleading communications in making important decisions
about their retirement, and because Unisys was aware of
pervasive confusion among its employees, it was not necessary
to “show[] that the employer had actual knowledge that a
particular employee was about to be misled.”  Daniels, 263 F.3d
at 76.  For all of these reasons, the Magistrate Judge did not err
in concluding that the materiality element was satisfied with
respect to both the misrepresentations and the inadequate
disclosures.
As to the fourth element, detrimental reliance, the
Magistrate Judge emphasized that the plaintiffs needed to
“prove on an individual basis the extent of the reliance and
resulting harm.”  Magistrate Report, 2006 WL 2822261, at *48.
The Magistrate Judge then detailed his findings for each
plaintiff and concluded that twelve of them demonstrated that
they reasonably relied on Unisys’ misrepresentations and
inadequate disclosures to their detriment; however the
Magistrate Judge determined that two of the retirees, plaintiffs
DiLoreto and Walnut, did not establish detrimental reliance.
The District Court agreed with this conclusion.  It reasoned that
plaintiff DiLoreto’s testimony that she refused an offer to return
to work because of her reliance on representations about her
retiree benefits was undermined by the fact that she had been
involuntarily terminated.  District Court Opinion, 2007 WL
2071876, at *9.  As for plaintiff Walnut, the District Court
reasoned that although he testified that he relied on Unisys’
misrepresentations in deciding to retire, this testimony was
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undermined by the undisputed fact that he retired as part of a
settlement agreement stemming from a lawsuit he brought
against Unisys.  Id.
In their cross-appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the
District Court’s findings with respect to these two plaintiffs on
the element of detrimental reliance are clearly erroneous.
Specifically, they argue that the District Court erred by not
considering that an employee’s “decisions outside the retirement
context also can establish detrimental reliance,” and by placing
the burden of demonstrating detrimental reliance on the
plaintiffs.  In response, Unisys asserts that the plaintiffs’
arguments ignore the deferential clear error standard we use to
review factual determinations, including those findings that
establish detrimental reliance, and instead attempt to have us
reweigh evidence and reject credibility determinations made by
the Magistrate Judge.  Unisys also argues that the plaintiffs
incorrectly assert that they do not have to establish detrimental
reliance.
As our discussion of the elements of a breach of fiduciary
duty claim makes plain, a plaintiff must establish detrimental
reliance in order to prevail on such a claim.  See Hooven, 465
F.3d at 571.  Consequently, the plaintiffs’ argument that
DiLoreto and Walnut did not need to establish detrimental
reliance in order to succeed on their claims is without merit.
Moreover, the District Court specifically noted that it was not
limited to considering retirement decisions, District Court
Opinion, 2007 WL 2071876, at *9, as did the Magistrate Judge,
reasoning that each plaintiff “may be able to establish
detrimental reliance by proving that he or she declined other
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employment opportunities, chose to forego the opportunity to
purchase supplemental health insurance, or made other
important financial decisions for his or her retirement,”
Magistrate Report, 2006 WL 2822261, at *54.  As a result, the
plaintiffs’ contention that the District Court erred by not
considering decisions outside the retirement context is also
without merit.  Because we do not discern any clear error with
respect to the individual factual findings that the District Court
made for each of the plaintiffs or any legal error in the
application of our caselaw to the facts of each plaintiff’s claim,
we agree with the District Court’s conclusions on this element.
In sum, the facts of this case, as determined by the
Magistrate Judge, demonstrate that Unisys, while acting in its
fiduciary capacity, breached its duty to twelve of the fourteen
plaintiffs by both misrepresenting and inadequately disclosing
material information regarding retiree medical benefits which
these twelve plaintiffs relied on to their detriment.  Accordingly,
the District Court, through its adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation, correctly concluded that twelve
plaintiffs could prevail on their breach of fiduciary duty claims
and we will affirm this decision.
B.  Equitable Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Where a plaintiff establishes a breach of fiduciary duty,
the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief pursuant to ERISA
§ 502(a), which provides that:
“A civil action may be brought – 
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* * *
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce the
provisions of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan . . . .”
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).  “In light of ERISA’s detailed
enforcement scheme,” courts must be careful to avoid creating
“‘remedies not specifically authorized by its text.’”  Pell, 539
F.3d at 305 (quoting Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002)).  To clarify the scope of
relief authorized by ERISA, the Supreme Court in Great-West
emphasized that “equitable relief must mean something less than
all relief,” and therefore “a reading of the statute that would
extend the relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to whatever relief
a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case
at issue (which could include legal remedies that would
otherwise be beyond the scope of the equity court’s authority)”
had to be rejected.  534 U.S. at 209-10 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The Supreme Court explained that “the term
‘equitable relief’ in § 502(a)(3) must refer to ‘those categories
of relief that were typically available in equity.’”  Id. (quoting
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).  Injunctions, mandamus, and
restitution – but not compensatory damages – are categories of
relief that the Supreme Court has recognized were typically
available in equity.  See id. at 215; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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However, because restitution can be either legal or
equitable, it is necessary to determine whether a particular
request for restitution constitutes permissible equitable relief
under ERISA.  See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212 (“[N]ot all
relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in
equity.”); Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193,
211-12 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]o determine whether a specific form
of underlying relief requested is available under § 502(a)(3)(B),
we must consider whether that relief was typically available at
law or in equity and, in the case of restitutionary relief, whether
the relief requested was in fact a form of equitable restitution.”).
In Great-West, the Supreme Court explained certain distinctions
between legal and equitable restitution:
“In cases in which the plaintiff could not assert
title or right to possession of particular property,
but in which nevertheless he might be able to
show just grounds for recovering money to pay
for some benefit that the defendant had received
from him, the plaintiff had a right to restitution at
law through an action derived from the common-
law writ of assumpsit. . . .  In contrast, a plaintiff
could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the
form of a constructive trust or equitable lien,
where money or property identified as belonging
in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly
be traced to particular funds or property in the
defendant’s possession.”
534 U.S. at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Crucial to
the question of whether restitution lies in equity is if the action
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seeks “to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in
the defendant’s possession,” as opposed to seeking to impose
personal liability on the defendant.  Id. at 214.
In the present case, after concluding that Unisys breached
its fiduciary duty to twelve of the plaintiffs, the Magistrate
Judge recommended that Unisys be ordered to provide retiree
medical benefits to the prevailing plaintiffs under a reconstituted
medical plan and that the benefit plan be reformed to remove
Unisys’ right to reduce or terminate the benefits.  Magistrate
Report, 2006 WL 2822261, at *65.  The rationale for the first
part of this remedy was that “[b]ecause the plan in which the
Prevailing Plaintiffs participated no longer exists, and they were
promised that the plan would provide medical coverage at no
cost at age sixty-five,” it would be appropriate equitable relief
to issue “a decree ordering Defendant to restore the Burroughs
Plan as it existed at the time each Prevailing Plaintiff retired, or
that Defendant create a new medical plan with identical
provisions as the Burroughs Plan.”  Id. at *63.
The District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to restore the plaintiffs’ medical plan but opted
not to reform the plan.  It explained:
“Rather than reform the benefit plan, the court
will modify the Report and Recommendation to
permanently enjoin Unisys from reducing or
terminating the retirees’ benefits in the
reconstituted Plan.  Since Trial Plaintiffs were
assured that their benefits would not be
terminated or reduced, Unisys will be enjoined
The District Court explained that reformation, as5
opposed to an injunction, would have been necessary if it was
awarding money damages for breach of the reformed contract.
District Court Opinion, 2007 WL 2071876, at *10 n.7.
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from reducing or terminating their reinstated
benefits.”5
District Court Opinion, 2007 WL 2071876, at *10.  The District
Court also acknowledged that, in addition to prospective relief,
the plaintiffs sought “payment representing the amount Unisys
financially gained as a result of their decision to retire,” and
argued that “the equitable remedies of ‘constructive trust’ and
‘accounting for profits’ permit them to recover money
damages.”  Id. at *11, *12.  With respect to the plaintiffs’
constructive trust theory of recovery, the District Court stated
that it was contrary to the Supreme Court’s explicit language in
Great-West that a constructive trust can only be placed on
“‘particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession,’”
and that, because the plaintiffs were unable to “identify the
particular property that belongs to them, [they were] seeking the
same relief as every claimant who seeks monetary damages:
money that they believe belongs to them.”  District Court
Opinion, 2007 WL 2071876, at *13 (quoting 534 U.S. at 213).
As for the plaintiffs’ accounting for profits theory of recovery,
the District Court explained that it was still necessary to “first
identify ‘particular funds or property in the defendants’
possession’ that belongs in good conscience” to them, and
because the plaintiffs “failed to identify a specific fund or
property from which they are entitled to the profits,” the District
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Court would not order this type of equitable relief.  Id. at
*13-14.
1.  The Injunctive Relief
Unisys argues that both components of the injunction
ordered by the District Court – reinstating the Burroughs
Medical Plan for these twelve plaintiffs and enjoining Unisys
from making any changes to the plan – “exceed [ERISA’s]
statutory remedial authority.”  Unisys’ chief complaint is that the
injunction restricts it “in its capacity as plan sponsor and
regulates non-fiduciary conduct,” and, as a result, the remedy
“cannot be reconciled with the settlor/fiduciary distinction
recognized in ERISA” because it eliminates “Unisys’ right, as
plan sponsor, to terminate retiree medical benefits ‘for any
reason at any time.’”  Unisys continues that “any remedy must
address Unisys in its fiduciary capacity and be limited to
enjoining fiduciary conduct.”  Unisys also argues that previous
decisions related to this litigation determined that the plaintiffs
“were not entitled to vested retiree medical benefits in the first
place,” so the relief ordered by the District Court is
inappropriate.
The plaintiffs respond that the injunctive relief ordered
by the District Court was appropriate because it “compels future
payments of medical benefits under a re-constituted plan,” and
“[t]he value of these benefits cannot be calculated in advance,
because benefits depend on actual medical usage by each retiree
and spouse and medical inflation as well as length of time each
will survive.”  The plaintiffs also contend that, notwithstanding
Unisys’ argument to the contrary, “the injunction here responds
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directly to [Unisys’] fiduciary violation” and requires Unisys “to
provide the equivalent of the lifetime benefits it misrepresented
the retirees would have.”  Alternatively, the plaintiffs maintain
that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to reform the plan
would be appropriate equitable relief as well.
In the context of a successful equitable estoppel claim
under ERISA, we have previously stated that “the main question
in assessing injunctions such as the one before us is whether the
injunction constitutes a permissible equitable remedy or an
impermissible legal one.”  Pell, 539 F.3d at 306.  In Pell, we
explained why the injunction was an equitable remedy and not
a legal one:
“Injunctions are legal remedies if they ‘compel
the payment of money past due under a contract,
or specific performance of a past due monetary
obligation, [a remedy that] was not typically
available in equity.’  The injunction imposed by
the District Court in this case is forward-looking
and entitles [the beneficiary] to an amount of
money that cannot be calculated with specificity
(since it is unknown how long he will survive and
be entitled to benefits.)  Therefore, the injunction
is an equitable remedy that is permissible under
ERISA.”
Id. at 307 (citation omitted).  In this same decision, we rejected
the argument that “ERISA provides a cause of action only to
recover the benefits that are due under the terms of an employee
benefit plan” and that a beneficiary “cannot receive relief
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beyond that specified by the plan terms.”  Id.  As support for
rejecting these arguments, we cited Unisys II, 57 F.3d at 1264-
65, and noted that the rationale applied equally for a breach of
fiduciary duty claim as for an equitable estoppel claim.  Pell,
539 F.3d at 307.  Thus, we concluded that the relief was
appropriate because it
“left the plan intact while acknowledging that
equity requires [the employer] to pay [the
beneficiary] a higher pension amount.  Our case
law clearly establishes the right of a plaintiff . . .
to receive relief beyond the benefits specified in
the plan, and the District Court injunction did not
rewrite or informally amend the plan.”
Id. at 308.
Although Pell involved pension benefits, the reasoning
applies with equal force to the present case.  Here, as in Pell, the
injunction “is forward-looking and entitles [the plaintiffs] to an
amount of money that cannot be calculated with specificity.”
See id. at 307.  Because the injunction effectuates prospective
relief, as opposed to “compell[ing] the payment of money past
due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due
monetary obligation,” it is an equitable injunction and not a
legal one.  See id.  Moreover, we reject Unisys’ argument that
the relief goes beyond the terms of the plan by granting vested
benefits because, as in Pell, the plaintiffs are entitled “to receive
relief beyond the benefits specified in the plan,” see id. at 308,
where, as a result of Unisys’ breach, the plaintiffs were led to
believe that they had lifetime benefits even though the plan itself
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did not provide for such vested benefits.  The relief does not
effectuate an informal plan amendment, but instead addresses
Unisys’ breach of fiduciary duty by preventing Unisys from
denying the plaintiffs the benefits that its communications
misled them to believe they would continue to enjoy for life.
We also disagree with Unisys that the injunction impermissibly
regulates its settlor activity.  The injunction is designed to
remedy Unisys’ violation of its fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs
for actions it took in its fiduciary capacity, and the specific
equitable relief provision of ERISA, which applies in this case,
trumps the application of the general principle that ERISA does
not regulate settlor activity.  Thus we conclude that the remedies
ordered by the District Court were carefully prescribed and are
consistent with both the statutory language of ERISA and
applicable caselaw, and we will therefore uphold the remedies
the District Court imposed.
2.  Additional Theories for Relief
In their cross-appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the District
Court committed error by refusing to order retrospective
monetary relief because it confused the requirements of a
constructive trust with those governing the distinct equitable
remedy of disgorgement of profits.  The plaintiffs argue that
“[t]here is no doubt that Unisys obtained ‘profits’ as a result of
its violations,” and they assert, without support from any legal
authority, that “[i]n equity, ‘profits’ include any form of benefit
the wrongdoer derived as a result of its violation, including
savings of money.”  According to the plaintiffs, the “significant
financial advantages” that flowed to Unisys as a result of its
fiduciary violation include the following:
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“(1) the avoidance of wages, pension and savings
plan accruals, and other fringe benefits it would
have had to pay to the retirees if they had not been
induced to retire or resign; (2) premiums paid to
Unisys by some retirees for medical coverage
under the replacement Unisys retiree medical plan
that took effect January 1, 1993; (3) medical
expenditures unjustly shifted to retirees who
secured their health insurance coverage from third
parties; (4) savings to Unisys as a result of
providing a plan of benefits that was inferior to
the promised Burroughs benefits; and
(5) additional gains to Unisys from its improper
retention and use of these funds.”
Unisys responds by arguing that the plaintiffs are really seeking
compensatory damages under the guise of an equitable remedy.
Unisys contends that, regardless of what the plaintiffs call their
request, they are attempting “to expand the limited scope of the
‘accounting for profits’ remedy traditionally available in equity
to encompass all forms of restitution for unjust enrichment.”
Moreover, Unisys asserts that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on
their request for an equitable accounting for profits without first
identifying the underlying property from which the profits are
purportedly derived.
Requests for monetary damages are suspect in this
context.  In the words of the Supreme Court:
“Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by
judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel
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the defendant to pay a sum of money to the
plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that
phrase has traditionally been applied, since they
seek no more than compensation for loss resulting
from the defendant’s breach of a legal duty.  And
money damages are, of course, the classic form of
legal relief.”
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).  Although “some forms of equitable relief –
such as constructive trusts, equitable liens, or accounting for the
profits derived from wrongly held property – include the
payment of money . . . , these forms of relief are available in
limited circumstances.”  Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644,
655 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, for the plaintiffs, the question
here is not whether disgorgement of profits or accounting for
profits is an equitable remedy, but rather whether the plaintiffs
have demonstrated that their claims for relief meet the
requirements for applying this type of remedy.  We agree with
the District Court that the plaintiffs cannot recover under this
theory without first identifying the profit generating property or
money wrongly held by Unisys.  See Great-West, 534 U.S. at
214 n.2.  Because the plaintiffs are unable to identify “money or
property . . . belonging in good conscience” to them and clearly
“trace[able] to particular funds or property in the defendant’s
possession,” see id. at 213, they cannot recover profits from
Unisys as a form of equitable relief.  Consequently, the District
Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ request for retroactive
monetary damages.
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Moreover, a review of the “significant financial
advantages” that the plaintiffs claim Unisys reaped at their
expense, and for which the plaintiffs seek to recover money,
makes it all the more apparent that the plaintiffs are trying to
recoup compensation for their own expenditures as opposed to
profits held by Unisys to which they are entitled.  See Eichorn,
484 F.3d at 656 (explaining that when the relief sought is
measured in terms of the plaintiffs’ loss as opposed to the
defendant’s gain, the monetary damages sought are in the nature
of a legal remedy and not an equitable one).  While we do not
doubt that the plaintiffs have incurred additional expenses as a
result of Unisys’ termination of the Burroughs Medical Plan,
compensation for these expenses does not come within ERISA’s
authorization of “appropriate equitable relief” and therefore is
not available as a remedy for Unisys’ breach of fiduciary duty.
See id. at 655 (rejecting a request from ERISA plaintiffs that
was “framed as an ‘equitable’ injunction” when “in essence,
[the] request [was] for compensatory damages”); see also Great-
West, 534 U.S. at 217 (“Like it or not, . . . [the law-equity]
classification and distinction has been specified by the statute;
and there is no way to give the specification meaning – indeed,
there is no way to render the unmistakable limitation of the
statute a limitation at all – except by adverting to the differences
between law and equity to which the statute refers.”).  Because
the additional relief the plaintiffs seek was not typically
available in equity, it is not an appropriate equitable remedy
under ERISA, and we will uphold the District Court’s decision
on this issue.
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C.  Attorneys’ Fees
“ERISA allows a prevailing party to recover a reasonable
attorney’s fee and costs of action.”  Hahnemann Univ. Hosp.,
514 F.3d at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted).  ERISA’s
fee provision states:  “In any action under this subchapter . . . by
a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion
may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to
either party.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).  In determining whether
to award attorneys’ fees, a District Court must consider several
factors.  See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir.
1983).  The relevant factors include:
“(1) the offending parties’ culpability or bad faith;
(2) the ability of the offending parties to satisfy
the award of attorneys’ fees; (3) the deterrent
effect of an award of attorneys’ fees against the
offending parties; (4) the benefit conferred upon
members of the pension plan as a whole; and
(5) the relative merits of the parties’ position.”
Id. at 673; accord Martorana v. Bd. Trs. of Steamfitters Local
Union 420 Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, 404 F.3d 797, 804
(3d Cir. 2005).  “[T]he Ursic factors are not requirements in the
sense that a party must demonstrate all of them in order to
warrant an award of attorney’s fees, but rather they are elements
a court must consider in exercising its discretion.”  Fields v.
Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2004).
The District Court, in its June 26, 2008 opinion, carefully
analyzed the Ursic factors and then went “line, by line, by line
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through the billing records supporting the fee request,” in the
course of “conclud[ing] that a total of $48,708.58 should be
stricken from the Petition,” and awarding $2,266,357.92 in
attorneys’ fees and $97,779.98 in litigation expenses.  Fee
Opinion, 2008 WL 2600364, at *14 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  With respect to the first Ursic factor, culpability or
bad faith, the District Court concluded that “this case does not
appear to involve a simple lapse of judgment or care on the part
of” Unisys, and that “[t]he duty of a fiduciary to convey
complete and accurate information to beneficiaries was
established long before [Unisys] engaged in the conduct at issue
in this case.”  Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).  As
to the second factor, ability to pay, the District Court noted that
the plaintiffs asserted that Unisys, “a large corporation with
billions of dollars in assets, can satisfy the fee award,” and that
Unisys did not challenge this assertion.  Id. at *4.  Under the
third factor, deterrence, the District Court determined that,
because Unisys’ “conduct was undertaken knowingly . . . , an
award of attorney’s fees would deter such knowing conduct in
the future.”  Id.  For the fourth factor, benefit conferred, the
District Court concluded that “[b]ased on the efforts of the
Prevailing Plaintiffs, the parties have a better understanding of
the strengths and weaknesses of the remaining claims, thus
allowing for prompt resolution or settlement.”  Id. at *5.
Finally, regarding the fifth factor, relative merits of the parties’
positions, the District Court concluded that although Unisys’
“legal position was not wholly without merit, . . . on balance,
this factor weighs slightly in favor of an award of attorneys’
fees.”  Id.  In sum, the District Court stated:  “No factor weighs
against a fee award, and the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the principle that ‘the defendant in an ERISA action
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usually bears the burden of attorney’s fees for the prevailing
plaintiff or plaintiff class, thus encouraging private enforcement
of the statutory substantive rights . . . .’”  Id. at *6 (select
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brytus v. Spang &
Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Despite the District Court’s thorough analysis of the
reasonableness of the fee award, Unisys contends that the award
should be “dramatically reduced,” arguing, in relation to the first
factor – culpability or bad faith – that “Unisys actually prevailed
on two of the three claims originally raised by Plaintiffs because
of its repeated disclosure[s],” and, in relation to the fifth factor
– relative merits – that “Plaintiffs have obtained only a very
small portion of the relief sought.”  Additionally, Unisys
maintains, apparently in the context of the fourth factor – benefit
conferred – that “the ‘prevailing’ Plaintiffs recovered only a
portion of the relief they sought, and two Plaintiffs lost on all of
their claims.”
The plaintiffs contend that the District Court correctly
applied the Ursic factors and did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that all five factors weighed in favor of the fee
award.  The plaintiffs also assert that, to the extent that Unisys
appears to argue that the fee amount must be proportionate to
the value of the relief obtained, its argument is foreclosed by
Hahnemann University Hospital, 514 F.3d at 311, in which a
“proportionality rule for attorneys’ fees awarded under ERISA”
was rejected.  Additionally, the plaintiffs point out that “Unisys
makes no argument concerning particular fee and expense
entries,” and instead contends that “the award should be
‘substantially’ reduced in some vague, undefined way.”
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Unisys’ arguments are not persuasive and the plaintiffs’
arguments help to underscore the reasonableness of the District
Court’s exercise of its discretion in approving the fee award.
The District Court’s thorough and careful analysis is consistent
with our Court’s caselaw on this subject and its award of
attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion.  Therefore, we
will not disturb its award of fees and expenses.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, the District Court correctly
concluded that twelve of the fourteen plaintiffs established that
Unisys breached its fiduciary duty to them and it ordered
appropriate equitable relief to remedy Unisys’ violation of
ERISA.  Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to the
plaintiffs.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s
orders in all respects.
